Whether a judge may add lawyers who may appear before the judge as "friends" on a social networking site, and permit such lawyers to add the judge as their "friend."The majority - correctly - said "no," in accord with the expectation that judges will not "convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge." The principle behind the majority's conclusion is this:
Irresponsible or improper conduct by judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.What's most interesting about the advice is the minority view on the Committee:
The minority believes that the listing of lawyers who may appear before the judge as "friends" on a judge's social networking page does not reasonably convey to others the impression that these lawyers are in a special position to influence the judge. The minority concludes that social networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the term "friend" on these pages does not convey the same meaning that it did in the pre-internet age; that today, the term "friend" on social networking sites merely conveys the message that a person so identified is a contact or acquaintance; and that such an identification does not convey that a person is a "friend" in the traditional sense, i.e., a person attached to another person by feelings of affection or personal regard...the minority concludes that identification of a lawyer who may appear before a judge as a "friend" on a social networking site does not convey the impression that the person is in a position to influence the judge...Two things stand out about the minority position:
First, there's a generation gap with regard to social networking, so that for some, a "Facebook friend" isn't necessarily a "real friend." But since some Facebook friends are indeed real friends, it seems to me that the minority is wrong. An observer would have to do a differential diagnosis of the term "friend." That process can't be counted on to protect public trust in the judge.
Second, both majority and minority were solidly focused on appearance. They don't ruminate about whether the judge is really friends with the lawyer and actually subject to influence. To maintain public trust judges don't simply scrutinize their motives - they have to start by scrutinizing how their conduct would appear to a skeptical observer.
We've not made that distinction at all well in medicine. Later this week I'll be writing about how failure to take appearance seriously is again undermining an important American Psychiatric Association initiative.
(The Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee opinion is available here.)